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REFLECTING ON THE 1980s: POSITIVISM VERSUS 
PLURALISM 
Bryant Smith*
The single most important development in the first century of the University 
of New Brunswick Law School may have taken place in the 1980s. Over the 
course of that decade the monistic influences of legal positivism which there­
tofore prevailed were beginning to be challenged by notions of legal pluralism 
which could be detected in the first part of the decade but were more prevelant 
by the decade’s end. The ascension of pluralism was due to changes which, by the 
end of the decade, had encultured an environment increasingly receptive to 
broader and deeper arguments about law. The changes of greatest consequence 
to the decline of legal positivism were the enactment of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the maturation of the faculty.
I have been invited to contribute an essay on the faculty of law over the 
decade of the 1980s because for much of that time I participated in the life of the 
law school as both student and teacher. I came first to the faculty at the begin­
ning of a decade as a student. During the middle years of the eighties I was away 
talcing a postgraduate law degree and gaining experience in a variety of law re­
lated roles. In 1988 I returned to the faculty to teach for two years, replacing a 
professor on leave. My reflections of the faculty must necessarily be comprehen­
sive; there are numerous exceptions to the generalizations here made. My at­
tempt is to place the development of the faculty of the 1980s in the context of 
larger legal and social movements.
My overall enduring impression of law school as a student in the first half of 
the 1980s is that it was a rigid environment which manifested a predisposition for 
circumscribed legal discourse and a willingness to observe the various incidents or 
elements of hierarchy.
The circumscribed nature of legal discourse was reflected in an impatience 
for argument or comment which was not strictly legal. For example, discussion of 
social history was eschewed. I recall a classmate asking about the historical back­
ground to a case which dealt with the persecution of a religious group only to be 
told by the teacher that ours was not a class in history. Discussion of political is­
sues were likewise deflected notwithstanding that they had far-reaching legal con­
sequences. When once a student queried the process by which judges were ap­
pointed, he received the curt response that this was not an appropriate topic for 
comment. A discussion of the personal experiences of students was also dis­
couraged. One of my classmates found it easiest to comprehend cases by as­
similating them to events which had touched on her own life or those of people 
she knew. She was told in no uncertain terms that the class had little patience for 
law from an experiential perspective.
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Within the first two months of law school ideas thought to be extraneous to 
the law itself had been sifted out. It was apparent that our task was to learn the 
law, and to learn it in a more or less uncritical fashion. This entailed a study of 
law primarily for its rules, not for its equity, a point which was made early on. We 
had been examining a nineteenth century case, the legal proposition of which 
raised the ire of a student who perceived it to be inequitable. The instructor's 
rejoinder was that law and justice are different. It was the instructor’s view that 
as law students we should content ourselves with learning the law that we might 
become competent practitioners; justice coufd be left to philosophers or until 
retirement. Thereafter, no discussion of the concept of justice, as such, or any 
particular conception of justice, took place. Justice arose only incidentally from 
time to time beneath such veiled epithets as “policy,” “equity,” or “reasonable­
ness.”1 There is a well known story, perhaps apocryphal, which relates that upon 
hearing a student’s complaint that a particular case was unjust, a teacher 
remarked that theirs was a faculty of law, not a faculty of justice.
The scope of discourse was not only delimited by express measure; it was also 
victim to the subtleties of gender exclusive language. I was surprised, at first, to 
learn that every abstract statement of law, be it common law or statute law, ex­
cluded women. I was even more surprised to see how readily this practice was ac­
cepted. In my three years as a law student, I cannot recall a single objection to 
this exclusionary form of legal discourse. The powerful impact of this linguistic 
myopia impressed itself on me several years later when I saw that a female col­
league had begun a letter to a law firm composed entirely of women with the 
saluation “Dear Sirs”
This circumscription in discourse was paralleled by the curriculum. 
Mandatory courses occupied fully two of the three years one spent in law school. 
These mandatory courses reflected the faculty’s central goal at the time - to 
prepare students for the practice of law. In consequence, there was little op­
portunity, in terms of time or course offerings, for a student to pursue a special 
interest, particularly if that special interest lay beyond a traditional practical area 
of the law.
Incidents of hierarchy were also very much apparent in the early 1980s. One 
incident related to the way in which one was to refer to certain legal personalities. 
For example, when discussing a decision, students, as a matter of convenience, 
would refer frequently to the judge only by last name, e.g. Martland. Some in­
structors would insist that the judge’s title be included in the appellation, e.g. Mr. 
Justice Martland. Criticism of judicial decisions was also to follow a defferential 
format. When acting as appellate in a moot court proceeding, one was to say 
“the learned trial judge erred” and not “the trial judge was wrong.” The point is 
that the law school consciously undertook to engender a dogmatic respect for the
Recourse to conceptions of justice, if only it the intuitive level, aie unavoidable in some hard cases. 
This intolerance to the broader ideas touching on law promoted the ironic statement from a 
classmate that law school was “anti-intellectual.”
legal hierarchy, an undertaking which, as we will see, has had an impact on the 
depth of legal argument.
The influence of hierarchy could be found even in the school’s architecture. 
Three of the four classrooms had about them the steeped dimension of an 
amphitheater with desks fixed to terraces in such a way as to focus the student’s 
attention down on the teacher. Bolts and terraces made it impossible to re­
organize the classroom environment in a maimer more conducive to communal 
riVnssinn- Even the lone seminar room, which was neither bolted nor sloped, 
could not resist aligning to the teacher a place of prominence. This was accom­
plished by a unique pyramidically shaped conference table which focussed atten­
tion to its stunted apex at which the teacher could be found.
What explains the constrained atmosphere of the law school in the early 80s? 
One possibility might be the dominant legal paradigm of the last two hundred 
years, legal positivism.
One of the central ambitions of legal positivism is to identify law in an objec­
tive manner. This is accomplished through empirical study which traces law to 
authority figures either sovereign or official. Tins view of law, as the product of 
authority, results in at least two important attributes. First, law is seen as being 
capable of separation from morality. Identifying law by reference to authority 
means that the positivist need not be concerned with the vagaries of morals - m 
the case of law, political morality in particular. Second, law is perceived on a 
hierarchical model. It is the combination of these attributes which may explain 
the rigidity of the law school environment in the early 1980s.
The central consequence of isolating law from morality was that it tended to 
delegitimize discourse beyond the strictly legal. In shorty arguments from 
morality or justice were seen to be beside the point.2 Accordingly, the law stu­
dent was denied access to evaluative arguments, a deprivation which was sup­
ported by the cu rr icu lu m  of the day which offered only one jurisprudence course. 
However, of greater moment and regret are the consequences of this denial. 
First, as students, we were never systematically exposed to justice. This implies 
that we failed to grasp the first principles of competing conceptions of justice, 
some of which underpin the law as we know it. A more important oversight, and 
a corollary of this failure, was that we overlooked an opportunity to develop the 
drilk necessary to effective and sophisticated evaluative legal argument. The sec­
ond regret belongs to the public which often looks to the legal culture at large to 
deliver justice, not merely law.4 The public would be surprised to learn that al­
Hjnless they were woven into a case by a master such as Lord Denning whose wide appeal may be 
attributed to an overarching concern for fairness.
3Recently there has been increased interest in skills development by law teachers. See, for example, 
B. Smith and A. Hardy, Contracts Law Learning Text, (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1990).
4Such appeals are encouraged by both government and law. Légal affairs come within the perview of 
the Department of Justice, (not Law).
though lawyers are trained to advise as to what the law is, few of them have ever 
been formally exposed to arguments as to what the law should be.
Not only was the law/morality dichotomy of law as authority made express in 
our early days of legal education, it was embedded through the power of constitu­
tional doctrine. The division of powers into legislative (and executive) on the one 
hand and judicial on the other, reinforced the law/politics dichotomy. Constitu­
tional dogma placed politics in the arena of the legislature while interpretation of 
legislation was ordained to be the proper role of the judiciary. In short, legis­
lators dealt in politics and its attendant moralities; judges, (and hence lawyers an^ 
law students) dealt in the word of the law.5
The second constraining attribute of positivism is hierarchy which arises be­
cause positivism contemplates superior and subordinate positions. The authority 
figure, whether sovereign or official, acts in a position of superiority when 
articulating law or interpreting and applying it to subordinates. As authority casts 
its gaze down the sides of the hierarchical pyramid, so obedience to authority 
directs its attention upward.
In the manner in which the effect of positivism’s law/morality dichotomy is 
felt throughout the larger legal culture, so too is the hierarchy of positivism repli­
cated throughout the culture’s institutions. Every institution apparently requires 
a sovereign-like figure head, be it the senior partner in a law firm, the chief jus­
tice of a court or the dean of a law school, notwithstanding that many of the sub­
stantive functions of each of these positions could be (and in some notable cases 
are) capably handled by a professional administrator.6
The trouble with authority hierarchies is that they command respect primari­
ly for positions on the ladder, not quality of ideas. Unless the superior in the 
hierarchy is a progressive, the formal structure of the hierarchy will overcome the 
substantive ideas of the subordinate. In time, the subordinate will assimilate to 
the orthodoxy of the structure. And so it went (and still goes) in law school.
As a student, I was struck with the efforts of the school to assimilate students 
to the legal hierarchy, both by act and omission. This assimilation frequently took 
place under the guise of decorum. The earlier example of some instructors insist­
ing that judges be referred to by name and title comes to mind. One might sug­
gest that attention to formality brings an air of civility to legal discourse. While 
this may be true, it must be acknowledged that such formalities are frequently 
misunderstood and serve to reinforce misplaced deference and respect for those 
in residence at the upper levels of the stratum. Formalism and protocol act to 
secure to the authority figure an assurance of obedience.
*It has only been recently that judges have looked to extra-legal sources for assistance in interpreting 
the words of statutes.
Vigure-head qua figure-head may be of arguable value. However, figure-head as leader raises im­
portant questions about creativity and about intellectual independence as it relates to the idea of 
professionalism.
As the legal hierarchy succeeds in eliciting obedience, conversely it tends to 
diminish argument and criticism. Respect for form and position translates into 
deference for substantive judicial opinion. Dissent, to the extent it is tolerated, is 
diffused by channeling it into an acceptable pattern.
In the law school, in the early 1980s, a by-product of the hierarchical tenden­
cies of positivism was intellectual servility through omission. There existed a 
presumption that a judge’s decision was right - a presumption which arose for 
want of critical evaluation. By and large, decisions were scrutinized for little 
more than their substantive rules. Judicial decisions came to be accepted uncriti­
cally.
This indiscriminate embrace of judicial decisions shaped and informed the 
way in which law was taught. If the role of judges was to authorize law and the 
role of citizens was to obey the law, the role of lawyers (and law students) was to 
know the law so as to advise citizens and assist judges. A teaching model evolved 
which effectively delivered the content of the law.
The teacher would assign 2 or 3 cases from the casebook. Prior to the next 
class the student would (sometimes) read the cases primarily to identify their 
legal rules. At the next class the teacher would communicate by lecture the 
“correct” articulation of the rules. The little7 discussion which ensued between 
teacher and students was usually limited to questions of clarification regarding 
rule identity. The student would then write down the legal rule, incorporate it 
into a set of CANS8 and later memorize it for reproduction to order on the exam.
The deference, respect and obedience inculcated by positivistic influences 
was reinforced and, in the minds of most, legitimized by common law^  and con­
stitutional theory. Stare decisis, precedent and the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy were each the object of attention in the first year grab bag course 
called Legal Method. Stare decisis and precedent assure that the voice of 
authority echoes throughout the many canyons of the common law while the doc­
trine of parliamentary supremacy assures that in any competitive din the voice of 
the legislature will ring loudest.
The combined effect of hierarchical deference and the teaching formula it 
bred was manifold. It encouraged a superficial understanding of the law, made 
possible the well-known phenomenon of the student who did little work but suc­
7It should be noted that an overly enthusiastic embrace of the case study method is responsible in 
large part for a paucity of discussion. There were, and are, so many cases to read that one cannot 
pause to analyze and digest them properly. This is a result of the misuse of the case study method. 
Rather **»•" review leading cases fully to comprehend cornerstone concepts and hone legal skills, 
cases were and are used to source an ever expanding corpus of legal rules. Class time is taken up 
dealing with cases by quantity rather than by quality.
®The anacronym CANS has been around at UNB at least since the 1940s according to a graduate of 
that time who advises that the letters stand for Consolidated Annotated Notes.
ceeded easily on exams9, stultified the learning environment10 and, most sig­
nificantly, through acquiescence it condoned intolerance to dissent and argument.
The primary legacy of legal positivism at the UNB law school during the 
1980s was the creation and fostering of a legal education environment which was 
permeated by two of positivism’s attributes: the law/morality dichotomy and 
hierarchy. The effect throughout the legal culture of both these incidents is to 
circumscribe argument. The existence of a law/morality dichotomy limited the 
scope of argument strictly to legal discourse thereby excluding questions of 
morality and justice while the incidents of hierarchy, or more precisely, obedience 
thereto, had the effect of limiting significantly both the desire for and the depth of 
argument. By the end of the decade, however, both these positions were under 
attack from within and outside the faculty.
On returning to the faculty in the late 1980s to teach, I found thing? to be 
markedly, although not thoroughly, different. The curriculum had been changed 
to decrease somewhat the number of required courses and a couple of legal 
theory offerings had become available. Some instructors permitted, even en­
couraged, students to address them on a first name basis and the 100% final exam 
had become considerably less prevalent, especially in first year courses. The stu­
dent body seemed to be more affluent - there has never been so many cars in the 
parking lot or Easter tans - and just about everyone could operate a personal 
computer.
The most dramatic change, however, was in the scope and depth of legal dis­
course. Professors who had hitherto been “black letter” jurists were now 
presenting various evaluative perspectives to their classes. Students, too, seemed 
interested in ideas which a few years earlier would have been viewed as irrelevant. 
For example, I injected the aboriginal perspective into real property and found 
that it was the most popular aspect of the course. Even more surprising, when 
contrasted with its status at the beginning of the decade, was the sustained discus­
sion of feminism.
It was feminist initiatives which generated the decade’s greatest controversy. 
In the summer of 1989 the faculty established a committee on gender-related 
policy. The committee identified faculty hiring policy as a priority and met 
through the autumn to deal with this matter. In February 1990 the committee 
presented to faculty a radical and highly debatable proposal for a hiring policy. 
The proposal had two components: a hiring goal for women and a strategy to 
achieve that goal. The committee proposed that the faculty set as a goal a faculty
^These students early on realized that if they could learn and apply legal rules they would be ahead 
of the game. One of my classmates, now a partner in a Saint John firm, would begin each semester 
about three weeks before exams by sitting down with the year-old CANS of a very good student.
10It was not long before most students stopped reading the cases with any imagination or creative in­
dependence. For those who read them at all the objective became to see the case in the way in 
which the instructor saw it.
composition of 40% for women.11 The strategy was to be one of quotas; in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances only women would be hired.  ^ The faculty, 
by a substantial majority, adopted the hiring goal for women of 40%, but tabled 
the proposal that the goal be achieved through quota.
These initiatives were covered extensively in the media and generated on­
going debate both in class and out. In short, feminism achieved a profile in the 
latter 1980s which, a few years earlier, would have been inconceivable. Feminism 
also achieved a change in legal discourse by insisting that gender inclusive lan­
guage be used and by validating personal experience as a gauge of legal propriety.
How, fundamentally, were the late 1980’s different from the early 1980s? 
The answer relates to the notion of legal pluralism.
In the early 1980s, as we have seen, the life of the faculty was constrained and 
intellectually homogeneous. This rigidity is explicable by reference to the 
authority paradigm of law as inspired by legal positivism. The two central con­
sequences of this paradigm, the law/morality dichotomy and hierarchy, had the 
effect of limiting the scope and depth of legal argument thereby leaving un­
challenged the received orthodoxy. By the end of the decade, the intellectual life 
of the faculty was considerably more fertile. Account was being taken of new 
ideas; ones which were inspired by social, historical and moral influences. The 
faculty was becoming receptive to a plurality of novel perspectives, the most 
prominent of which was feminism.
Unconstrained argument - the type which is encouraged by good legal analy­
sis - provides an avenue to legal pluralism. Good legal analysis has two com- 
ponents: descriptive and normative or evaluative. Descriptive analysis occurs at 
various levels. Positivistic law is interested chiefly in an authontative legal des­
cription. It seeks merely to identify and classify the legal rule of a case but does 
notpursue the inquiry beyond the surface to the deeper justifications of the rule 
for fear that it will encounter politics in these subterranean depths. In con­
sequence, there is a shallow analysis of law which fails to recognize the values 
which underpin the rule. The effect of such willful blindness is to dim dramatical­
ly the lawyer’s evaluative vision.
The evaluative component of good legal analysis presupposes a deep descrip­
tion of law. It is only after an idea has been identified and articulated at a 
meaningful level that evaluation is possible or valuable. Regarding law, the level 
of most meaningful description is the level of values. It is values which comprise 
competing conceptions of justice and, therefore, it is the values in what the law w 
which must be available for evaluation against conceptions which suggest what 
the law should be.
“At the time of the recommendation women held 115% of the teaching positions in the faculty.
12At present rates of attrition it would be well into the next century before the goal would be 
reached, even with quota hiring.
Of course, describing law at a deep level can be highly controversial. Deep 
argument can help to resolve the controversy or, at least, to expose it. Evaluating 
law, once it has been most meaningfully described, is even more difficult and con­
troversial. It is difficult because it requires familiarity with a broad range of con­
ceptions of justice and it is controversial because no way has yet been found to 
best resolve the choice amongst com peting conceptions,
«tu In T  sense* may be most important for its expository power.
When deployed to full advantage within the framework of legal analysis, it ex­
poses legal rules as particularizations of political values and then exposes those 
values as a choice amongst a variety of legitimate contenders. It is this realization 
which engenders the tolerance necessary to legal pluralism. This realization, born 
of argument, demands an environment in which robust debate can occur. The 
paradigm set up by legal positivism must succumb to pluralistic influences which 
foster broad and deep argument in the absence of rancor.
Legal pluralism is prepared to contemplate a legal rule as an answer, not the 
answer. Argument is used first to suggest a deeper description of law, and second 
to suggest that the law is right or wrong. Recognizing the qualitative nature of 
moral discourse, legal pluralism takes a generous and forgiving view of an op­
ponent s position and proposals.
This pluralistic conceptualization of law which welcomes argument and is de­
pendent on it'challenges the influences of positivism’s dual incidents: the 
law/morality dichotomy and hierarchy. First, pluralism is uninterested in confin­
ing its deliberations to the strictly legal. It aspires to good legal analysis and ac­
cordingly wishes to deepen and broaden legal inquiry so as to take into account 
the significance of politics. Second, pluralism seeks to focus on the quality of 
ideas and not the rung on the hierarchal ladder from which the idea originates. 
Having disabused itself of circumscribed discourse and obedience to status, 
pluralism is free to entertain fearlessly a variety of ideas. Under pluralism a 
tolerant intelligence replaces dogmatism as the mortar of legal institutions.
. uThu / iSe ° l leLgal Pluralism the faculty by the end of the 1980s is at­
tributable to the broader and deeper arguments of enhanced legal analysis 
wrought of two factors: the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the maturation of faculty members.
JJt yet completed first year when the Charter was proclaimed on 17 
April 1982. The Charter asserts various individual and group rights the abstract 
articulations of which were legitimized for the first time, and at a constitutional 
level. Positive law does little to provide particularized formulations of these ab­
stract rights. Individuals and groups were driven to search beyond the extant law 
tor the arguments they needed because little, if any, legal authority existed to 
define these novel rights. They had to venture outside law into a field of moral 
ideas, the view of which was unobstructed by hierarchy. They had at last to sur­
vey a plurality of pre-legal ideas, many of which spring from the seeds of natural
law and justice and, they had, at last, to confront the types of arguments these 
seeds would germinate.
The growth of argument inspired by the Charter parallels a maturing of the 
faculty as a whole. At the beginning of the 1980s, the majority of faculty mem­
bers were embarking on their careers. Any new teacher will attest that a daily di­
gesting of course material, even at a superficial level, can be demanding. By the 
end of the decade, most of the faculty had considerable teaching experience and 
some promising scholarly work as well. They had long since grown restless with 
knowing merely the legal rules of their areas of expertise and had begun to specu­
late as to their deeper inspirations, a speculation which, in turn, prompted evalua­
tive considerations. In short, as the decade dosed, faculty members were more 
interested in deeper and broader arguments.
All of this is not to suggest that by the end of the 1980s the faculty had com­
pletely re-constituted itself as a seat of legal pluralism. In fact, the manner in 
which some opponents of feminism advanced their position is telling. Rather 
than listen to and identify the weaknesses of the feminists’ position, an attempt 
was made to quell the debate. Such tactics have no place in a community of 
scholars in which the free exchange of ideas is fundamental. Their use suggests 
the tolerance which is necessary to true and full pluralism has not yet been 
developed in the faculty as a whole. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that 
pluralistic ideas are at least on the table and are being given more serious consid­
eration by the balance of the faculty. Further, it must be emphasized that the fac­
ulty does not have a tradition of argument on which to call for guidance in the 
resolution of highly debatable and emotional issues. The challenge of the 1990s 
will be to build such a tradition, the foundation of which was laid in the 1980s.
“ in terms of pluralism, a weakness in the feminist position in the faculty arose from a paradox. The 
fact that feminist arguments were being advanced seemingly had pluralistic consequences. Un­
fortunately, the radical feminists on faculty who were advancing these arguments were themselves în- 
tolennt of claims from different perspectives. It is likely that they feared their own political aspira­
tions would be undermined by an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of other positions. These fem­
inists, all men, contributed to pluralism without being pluralists themselves.
